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Remittances and Labour Supply in Post-Conflict Tajikistan   
 
 
Patricia Justino and Olga N. Shemyakina 
 
 
 
Summary  
 
This paper analyzes the impact of remittances on the labour supply of men and women in 
post-conflict Tajikistan. We find that on average men and women from remittance-receiving 
households are less likely to participate in the labour market and supply fewer hours when 
they do. The negative effect of remittances on labour supply is smaller for women, which is 
an intriguing result as other studies on remittances and labour supply (primarily focused on 
Latin America) have shown that female labour supply is more responsive to remittances. The 
results are robust to using different measures of remittances and inclusion of variables 
measuring migration of household members. We estimate a joint effect of remittances and an 
individual’s residence in a conflict-affected area during the Tajik civil war. Remittances had a 
larger impact on the labour supply of men living in conflict-affected areas compared to men in 
less conflict-affected areas. The impact of remittances on the labour supply of women does 
not differ by their residence in both the more or less conflict affected area. 
 
Keywords: international migration; remittances; labour markets; Tajikistan. 
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Introduction and motivation 
 
Labour migration has become an important component of household coping strategies in 
countries affected by armed conflict. Violent outbreaks are typically associated with large 
population movements when individuals, households and sometimes whole communities are 
forced into displacement (Moore and Shellman 2004). While displacement is in most cases 
involuntary, economic incentives can be an important factor in decisions to migrate, either as 
an ex-ante reaction to the threat of conflict, or an ex-post response to unstable economic and 
political conditions (Engel and Ibanez 2007; Czaikas and Kis-Katos 2009). The significance 
of labour migration in conflict-affected countries is reflected in the large increase in 
remittances to migrant and refugee exporting countries that have experienced recent political 
crises (Goldring 2003).  
 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of remittances on individual labour supply in post-
conflict Tajikistan. We analyze the differentiated impact of remittances on the decision to 
participate in the labour market and on the number of work hours supplied by men and 
women living in both conflict affected areas and the areas less affected by the civil war. To 
study this question, we use individual and household-level data from the 2003 Tajik Living 
Standards Measurement Survey. We combine these data with the raion (district) level data 
on the conflict events that was collected by one of the authors (see Shemyakina 2007). We 
then evaluate the joint effect of remittances and household exposure to armed conflict on 
individual labour supply. 
 
The development literature has long recognized the importance of migration (and resulting 
remittances) as a mechanism used by households in peacetime to secure income and 
improve welfare. The impact of remittances in conflict settings is largely under-researched. 
Researchers and policymakers have focused on understanding the impact of violent conflict 
on internally displaced and refugee populations while limited attention has been paid to 
populations remaining in areas of conflict and the mechanisms they develop to cope with 
violence (Justino 2009). This area of research is hindered by lack of data, insufficient official 
information on the flow of transfers in conflict areas and difficulties in tracking remittances 
that are made through informal channels (Lindley 2007).  
 
Remittances have, however, the potential to be important mechanisms of household security 
both during and after conflict. Lindley (2007) shows that large-scale migration in Hargeisa, 
Somalia, triggered by armed conflict, resulted in a valuable source of income for those left 
behind. Remittances were used for general living expenses and human capital investments 
and contributed to mitigating the economic and social effects of the conflict such as lack of 
access to markets, loss of livelihoods, and the removal of children from school. Remittances 
played a particularly important role in woman-led households where the breadwinner was 
lost to conflict or migrated. Justino and Shemyakina (2008) show that, following the 1992–
1998 Tajikistan civil war, households receiving remittances from relatives who lived abroad 
had higher overall consumption expenditure, but did not differ from households without 
remittances in the allocation of household expenditure towards food, education and medical 
expenses.  
 
While remittances often serve as important source of income for households that stayed 
behind, this additional income may have a negative effect on the labour supply of non-
migrant family members. Remittances are a form of non-labour income for those who stayed 
behind. An increase in the non-labour income available to a household leads to an increase 
in reservation wages of household members and a decrease in the opportunity cost of leisure 
(Killingsworth 1983), which may cause a decrease in labour supply of members of 
households that receive remittances.  
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The literature on the microeconomic effects of remittances has focused primarily on peaceful 
contexts. When data from the conflict-affected countries are used, the effect of conflict is 
rarely taken into account. However, violent conflict may affect the very structure of labour 
markets, as well as fundamental individual incentives, tastes and preferences, leading 
households to make decisions in very different ways compared to what they would have 
done in a peaceful setting (see Blattman and Miguel 2010; Justino 2009, 2012).  
 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we attempt to advance current 
understanding of the role of remittances in post-conflict settings by looking at the 
differentiated ways in which individual labour supply responds to remittance flows in conflict 
and non-conflict affected communities.  
 
Second, we contribute to the emerging literature on the economic impact of armed conflict by 
analyzing important labour market effects. While the literature on the economic 
consequences of violent conflict has advanced understanding of the impact of armed 
violence on household composition (through deaths, injuries and so forth) and household 
human capital (through effects on health and education; see review in Justino, forthcoming), 
only recently have researchers started studying the impact of civil war on labour market 
outcomes of civilians (Galdo 2010; Menon and van der Meulen 2010; Shemyakina 2010).  
 
Third, we revisit the literature on the impact of remittances on individual labour supply using 
the case of Tajikistan. The country has experienced some of the most significant migration 
flows in its recent history,1 but remains largely under-researched as a case study. The 2003 
Tajik Living Standards Measurement Survey (henceforth, TLSS 2003) is used to fill this gap. 
The TLSS survey is one of the few nationally representative micro-level surveys that 
attempts to trace remittance flows in a post-conflict setting (the data was collected a few 
years after the 1992–1998 civil war in Tajikistan). Our analysis focuses on men and women 
aged 16–65.  
 
Similar to previous literature, we find that the amount of remittances received by a given 
household has an overall negative impact on the number of labour hours supplied by men 
and women in the household. The effect of remittances is found to be stronger for men than 
for women. Such a result is intriguing as previous research on the effects of remittances on 
labour supply has shown female labour supply is typically more responsive to changes in 
remittances (Funkhouser 1992; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Hanson 2007).  
We argue that our results are explained largely by the exposure of certain communities to the 
civil war. Remittances are found to have a negative and significant effect on the labour 
supply of males in conflict affected areas, but no significant effect on the labour supply by 
women in those areas. This effect could be explained by changes in attitudes and 
preferences of individuals, in particular women, during the period of the conflict. 
 
In the next section, we review findings from studies on the effects of remittances on the 
labour market participation of household members who stayed behind. We then discuss 
recent trends in conflict, labour migration and remittances in Tajikistan, and put forward the 
relevant data and descriptive statistics (Section 2). In Section 3, an empirical specification is 
presented and we employ and discuss the theoretical expectations. In Section 4, the main 
empirical results are explored. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
 
                                                 
1  In the dataset, remittances from family members and other relatives in Tajikistan constitute about 23 per cent of total 
household expenditure for those households that report receiving remittances (authors’ calculations using TLSS 2003 
data). Remittances are the second largest source of income for these households after wages (World Bank 2003). 
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1  Literature review 
 
Prior studies on the economic effects of remittances have found significant changes in labour 
force participation, labour hours and allocation of labour supply across sectors, in response 
to increases in remittances (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Damon 2007; Funkhouser 
1992; Rodriguez and Tiongson 2001). Overall, these studies find that remittances result in a 
decrease in the number of labour hours supplied and in the labour force participation of 
working age men and women. These effects are typically greater for women. While men are 
found to reallocate their labour hours from formal employment towards potentially riskier 
activities, such as self-employment, women tend to withdraw from the labour force (often 
informal labour market activities). The authors argue that the impact of remittances is similar 
to an increase in non-labour income received by a household (for instance an inheritance). 
An increase in non-labour income is often associated with a decrease in the opportunity cost 
of leisure and the relaxation of credit constraints. These effects in turn allow for a greater 
tolerance of risk and increased participation in self-employment.  
 
Funkhouser (1992) examined the relationship between migration, remittances, labour force 
and self-employment participation using cross-sectional data from post-conflict Nicaragua. 
He finds that an increase in remittances has a positive impact on self-employment and a 
negative effect on labour force participation. The first result is attributed to less restrictive 
credit constraints and the second to an increase in non-wage income. He finds that for each 
$100 increase in remittance income (from 0) the probability of labour force participation 
decreases by 2.1 percentage points for males and 5.0 percentage points for females.  
Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) study the effect of having a migrant amongst household 
members on the individual probability of labour force participation in urban Philippines. They 
find that having a migrant member in the household decreases the probability of male labour 
force participation by 9.4 percentage points. For women, this effect is almost twice as large 
(18.1 per cent).  
 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) examine differences in hours worked in different types of 
employment by men and women in Mexico. Once endogeneity of remittances is corrected 
for, remittances are found to be associated with variation of male labour supply across 
various categories of employment. Men in particular supply fewer hours to the formal sector 
and increase their participation in the informal sector. In contrast, women in rural areas work 
fewer hours in response to increases in remittances. Typically, they withdraw their 
participation from the informal labour sector and from unpaid work.   
 
Damon (2007) uses panel data from El-Salvador to study the effect of migration on the 
allocation of labour hours within households. She finds that the decision to migrate affects 
household labour allocation amongst agricultural households. The amount of remittances 
received does not have a significant impact. As the household engages in migration, it 
increases the number of labour hours committed to on-farm work and decreases the number 
of hours spent in off-farm employment. The effect is the same for adult men and women and 
children. 
 
The effects of remittances in conflict affected countries are so far largely unknown. While 
some of the studies reviewed above (e.g. Funkhouser 1992; Acosta 2006; Damon 2007) use 
data from countries recovering from conflict, they do not explicitly control for the effects of 
armed conflict in their studies. Some households in conflict affected settings may protect 
their welfare through migration. Employment markets are also likely to be affected by armed 
conflict in ways that affect the response of households to changes in income transfers. 
Ibáñez and Moya (2006) find that unemployment is prevalent amongst displaced populations. 
Kondylis (2010) shows that displaced populations are less likely to work in the post-conflict 
period and the productivity levels of returnees tend to be lower than those that stayed. One 
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important effect is the death of males in working age that may lead to changes in the 
household reallocation of labour with women and children replacing lost male workers 
(Justino 2009; Rodriguez and Sanchez 2009).  
 
A large literature in labour economics has studied the added worker effects (AWE) of 
economic shocks, where women join the workforce in response to unemployment of other 
household members, particularly husbands (for example, Lundberg 1985; Finegan and 
Margo 1994; Fernandes and de Felicio 2005). This body of research argues that female 
labour supply is the most responsive to male unemployment in the short run when women 
join the workforce to replace temporarily lost income. In the long-run, the research shows 
that it is household consumption rather than female labour supply that adjusts to a 
permanent drop in income. It is possible that this effect may be present in post-conflict 
settings. However, this has not been yet studied.  
 
In the following section, we describe trends in migration and remittances flows and provide 
background on the 1992–1998 armed conflict in Tajikistan. We investigate the joint impact of 
remittances and conflict exposure amongst Tajik households in Sections 3 and 4. 
 
 
2  The Tajikistan case study 
 
2.1 Overview 
The 1992–1998 Tajik armed conflict claimed at least 100,000 lives. About 18 per cent of the 
country’s population was displaced in the first few years of the war. The majority of displaced 
and refugees returned to their homes by 1995. While fighting during the conflict triggered 
temporary displacement, the destruction of industries and agricultural assets motivated a 
large labour migration of Tajiks to other parts of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) as borders 
between the Former Soviet Union Republics were still relatively open. Migration to this region 
was facilitated by the shared Soviet culture, similarities between education systems and 
fluency in Russian language. These temporary migration movements presented many Tajiks 
with an opportunity to establish social and economic networks outside of Tajikistan. Recent 
research has shown that access to migrant networks in the recipient countries is associated 
with higher incomes for migrants and access to better jobs (Munshi 2003; Beaman 2009). 
 
Since 1991, labour migration from Tajikistan and the influx of migrant remittances to 
Tajikistan have become very common. By 2005, almost every family in Tajikistan had sent at 
least one family member abroad as a migrant worker (IMF 2005). Based on the official data 
for Tajikistan (Table 2.1), 492.2 thousand people left the country between 1991 and 2005, 
which constitutes about eight per cent of the population. About 83.8 per cent of the migrants 
left during the civil war period between 1991 and 1998. Estimates on the number of Tajik 
migrants vary however within wide margins. Between 2002 and 2005, the estimated number 
of Tajik migrants in neighboring countries varied from 64,000 to 600,000 registered Tajik 
migrants and from 26,000 to 800,000 temporary visitors (Kireyev 2006). More reliable 
estimates show that more than 620,000 seasonal migrant workers (about 18 per cent of adult 
population) annually travel from Tajikistan to Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan (Kireyev 2006). 
 
In the first years of the migration movement, migrants were predominantly middle-age males 
who often took low skilled jobs in agriculture or construction. However, in recent years, the 
demographic composition of migrants has started to change. The proportion of young 
unmarried men, married older women who leave children behind, and younger women with 
higher education, has increased (Olimova and Bosc 2003).  
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Tajik migrant workers send home amounts that correspond to a higher share of country’s 
GDP as compared to remittances sent by workers in traditionally high remittance countries. 
For example, private remittances to Bangladesh, Egypt and Morocco do not exceed 10 per 
cent of total GDP, while remittances to Tajikistan are estimated to fall within the range of 
US$400 million to US$1 billion a year, or to 20 to almost 50 per cent of total GDP (Kireyev 
2006).  
 
Table 2.1 Migration flows, Tajikistan 1991–2005 (thousand persons) 
 
Year Arrived Departed 
Migration 
inflows (+)/ 
outflows (-) 
Including: 
arrived from 
abroad 
Including: 
left for 
abroad 
International 
migration 
inflows (+)/ 
outflows (-) 
1991 74.9 101.3 -26.4 20 48.6 -28.6 
1992 51.3 146 -94.7 11.3 104.7 -93.4 
1993 71.4 146.1 -74.7 12 86.3 -74.3 
1994 43.3 88.8 -45.5 6.6 55.1 -48.5 
1995 37.1 74.9 -37.8 5.5 45.3 -39.8 
1996 26.1 53.7 -27.6 3.7 34.1 -30.4 
1997 20.2 37 -16.8 3.3 21.1 -17.8 
1998 16.9 32.3 -15.4 2.7 17.6 -14.9 
1999 14.7 28.8 -14.1 1.8 14.7 -12.9 
2000 14.5 28.2 -13.7 1.7 14.6 -12.9 
2001 16.7 29.1 -12.4 1.7 12.9 -11.2 
2002 17.7 30.2 -12.5 1.4 12 -10.6 
2003 16.9 27.9 -11 1.4 10.2 -8.8 
2004 15.2 24.6 -9.4 1.1 7.9 -6.8 
2005 18 27.3 -9.3 1.1 7.3 -6.2 
Source: State Statistical Committee (2006) 
 
Remittances from temporary and permanent migrants have significantly contributed to 
reducing poverty rates in Tajikistan in the post-war period between 1999 and 2003 (World 
Bank 2004). In 2003, remittances and other transfers to households ranked as a second 
largest income source after wages, and constituted about 10 per cent of average household 
income (World Bank 2004). Table 2.2 provides details on the size of remittances in relation to 
various items in the balance of payments of Tajikistan.   
 
Table 2.2 Migrant remittances and their relative size in Tajikistan balance of payments 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Net Migrant Remittances 0 -1 65 82 133 321 
Inflows 1 4 78 146 252 465 
Outflows -1 -5 -13 -64 -119 -144 
Gross remittances/ Exports (%) 0 1 11 18 23 42 
Gross remittances/ Trade Deficit (%) 3 3 63 72 167 146 
Gross remittances/ FDI (%) 3 47 356 456 93 852 
Gross remittances/ Net Borrowing (%) 2 70 560 456 -149 932 
Gross remittances/ Gross Reserves (%) 1 4 82 108 133 207 
Source: IMF and National Bank of Tajikistan (as quoted in World Bank 2006) 
 11 
 
Despite the large extent of labour migration from Tajikistan since the 1990s, the significance 
of remittances for the local economy was noticed only recently due to a sudden surge in 
registered remittances after 2002 (Table 2.2), when migrants began using banks to send 
funds to their families (Kireyev 2006). Official figures are nonetheless likely to misrepresent 
the true level of remittances in Tajikistan as it is difficult to separate migrant remittances from 
private transfers (between households) or estimate remittances from informal flows of 
money. It is estimated that only 25 per cent of remittances go through formal channels, 
excluding foreign goods (Olimova and Bosc 2003). The estimates of remittances from 
household surveys such as the TLSS 2003 are more likely to record remittances received by 
households through most channels not captured in other official sources (Kireyev 2006). In 
this study, we rely on household data to analyze the impact of remittances on household 
labour allocation decisions. One important limitation of the remittance data from the surveys 
is that remittances brought home by migrants themselves are not likely to be recorded in the 
category of ‘remittances received from other household members’. Therefore, we employ 
several measures of remittances and migration to account for potential measurement error in 
remittances. 
 
2.2 Descriptive statistics: migration and remittances 
To study remittances and their impact on household labour supply, we use household data 
from the 2003 Tajik Living Standards Measurement Survey. The survey was conducted by 
the State Statistical Agency of Tajikistan in cooperation with the World Bank and several 
Tajik and international agencies. It contains detailed information on household composition, 
employment, consumption and expenditure, migration, and private and public transfers for a 
sample of 4,160 households. The survey also has detailed information on monetary and in-
kind transfers received by each household from family members and institutions, such as 
NGOs. Transfers from government, such as various pensions and allowances, are 
accounted for in a separate section of the survey and are used for calculation of non-wage 
income received by the household.  
 
In this paper, we focus on the analysis of remittances in the form of monetary and in-kind 
transfers sent by family members (household members and other relatives) living abroad or 
in Tajikistan. 20.7 per cent of 4,160 households interviewed in 2003 indicated that they 
received either a monetary or in-kind remittances from a family member in the last 12 
months. About 9.6 per cent indicated that they received remittances from a family member 
located abroad. 93 per cent of the remitters who live abroad live in Russia, while the rest 
resides in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other countries. The 2003 data do not contain socio-
demographic information on the migrants who are currently abroad and who send 
remittances and thus we are not able to control for these in our analysis.2  
 
The summary statistics for remittance-receiving and non-remittance receiving households 
from the 2003 TLSS are presented in Table 2.3. Remittance-receiving households are 
defined as households that received monetary and in-kind transfers from household 
members and other relatives in the 12 months prior to being interviewed. Overall, remittance-
receiving and non-receiving households report very similar total and per capita household 
expenditure in the 30 days before the survey. 68per cent of household monthly expenditure 
is spent on food items.  
 
Remittance-receiving households are slightly smaller than non-receiving households. 26 per 
cent of remittance-receiving households are headed by women, in comparison to 18 per cent 
for non-receiving households (significant at 1 per cent level). Further, household heads in 
remittance-receiving households are less likely to be currently married, have a lower 
                                                 
2  The only information available on individual migrants is the relationship of each to the household head. Most migrants 
fall into one of three categories: the household head himself or herself, and spouses and children of household heads. 
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educational level and are less likely to having been employed in the 14 days prior to the 
interview. 43 per cent of remittance-receiving households have a household member who 
lived abroad in the last 12 months as compared to 13per cent of households who did not 
report to receive remittances. The average amount of annual remittances is about 700 
somoni or 258.30 USD (2.71 somoni per 1USD was the exchange rate for July 2003, IMF 
2005).  
 
Households in the conflict affected areas are more likely to have migrants who are currently 
in the household (21.3 vs. 15.8 per cent) in comparison to households in the lesser affected 
areas. The average values of annual remittances received vary slightly, with households in 
conflict affected areas receiving about 156 somoni per year as compared to 128 somoni for 
households in the lesser affected areas. 
 
Table 2.3 Summary statistics by household remittance-receiving status  
 
Variable 
Remittance Receiving Remittance non-receiving Diff. p-
value Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Characteristics of the household head             
Age 864 48.58 (15.417) 3296 49.07 (14.691) (0.387) 
Female 864 0.26 (0.437) 3296 0.18 (0.386) (0.000) 
Married 864 0.72 (0.448) 3296 0.78 (0.412) (0.000) 
Educational level 728 11.00 (3.246) 3092 11.22 (3.104) (0.079) 
Not employed in the last 14 days 864 0.39 (0.487) 3296 0.29 (0.454) (0.000) 
Household size 864 6.06 (3.226) 3296 6.34 (3.077) (0.019) 
Dependency ratio (under 
16+66&above)/Adults 16–65) 828 1.01 (0.853) 3233 1.00 (0.820) (0.839) 
Total Expenditure (somoni) 864 294.42 (246.504) 3296 297.95 (211.692) (0.674) 
Total Expenditure per capita (somoni) 864 56.09 (47.153) 3296 53.42 (41.959) (0.105) 
Average decile based on total 
expenditure 864 5.71 (2.864) 3296 5.57 (2.860) (0.177) 
Share of food expenses 864 0.68 (0.148) 3295 0.68 (0.152) (0.554) 
Non-wage income (somoni) 864 6.90 (14.153) 3296 6.77 (17.970) (0.835) 
Migration/ remittances variables       
Household has at least one household 
member who migrated abroad in the 
last 5 years 
864 0.43 (0.495) 3296 0.13 (0.336) (0.000) 
Number of donors-relatives who send 
money to the household 864 1.18 (0.550) 3296 0.00 
  
Donors abroad 864 0.55 (0.595) 3296 0.00   
Donors in Tajikistan 864 0.63 (0.760) 3296 0.00   
Donors abroad-dummy 864 0.50 (0.500) 3296 0.00   
Donors in Tajikistan-dummy 864 0.52 (0.500) 3296 0.00   
Total amount sent by donors 864 700.05 (1233.717) 3296 0.00   
Monetary remittances 864 631.89 (1212.204) 3296 0.00   
In-kind remittances 864 68.16 (149.983) 3296 0.00   
Head of household or spouse of the 
head are away 864 0.23 (0.421) 3296 0.01 (0.076) (0.000) 
Rural location 864 0.59 (0.492) 3296 0.65 (0.478) (0.001) 
Proportion of households that had at 
least one migrant in a psu 864 0.16 (0.233) 3296 0.05 (0.149) (0.000) 
Source: Authors’ calculations (TLSS 2003) 
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2.3 Descriptive statistics: labour force participation and hours worked  
The analysis of descriptive data that follows indicates that the receipt of remittances appears 
to have a significant impact on labour supply of men and women aged 16–65. Men from 
remittance receiving households are less likely to work (Figure 2.1, top panel). Further, 
conditional on employment, men and women in remittance-receiving households work fewer 
hours than those in the households that do not receive remittances (Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.1 Mean workforce participation rate in the last 14 days by gender and 
household remittance-receiving status. Age 16–65 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS 2003 
 
Figure 2.2 Mean weekly labour hours (excluding zeros) by gender and household 
remittance-receiving status. Age 16–65 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS 2003. 
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Table 2.4 Individual’s employment status in the last 14 days by gender and household 
remittance-receiving status. Ages 16–65 
 
  
Male Female 
Receives 
remittances 
Does not 
receive 
remittances 
Receives 
remittances 
Does not 
receive 
remittances 
No work last 14d 39.45 29.12 54.09 51.16 
Looking for work 4.45 2.6 1.23 1.42 
Not looking for work 35.00 26.52 52.67 49.93 
Worked last 14 days 60.55 70.87 45.92 48.84 
Worked for non household member 25.02 32.36 14.85 17.27 
Worked on farm owned self/household member 25.38 29.91 24.92 27.14 
On own account/business owned by self or household member 7.21 7.72 3.85 3.02 
Occasional job 0.45 0.11 0.68 0.2 
On leave from permanent job 2.49 0.77 1.62 1.21 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 1,123 5,429 1,481 5,870 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
 
Table 2.5 Distribution of labour hours worked last 14 days, ages 16–65, by household-
remittance receiving status 
 
Mean hours worked in the last 14 days 
Panel A: Males (16–65)   
Does not 
receive 
remittances N 
Receives 
remittances N 
Diff 
hours 
p-value 
 
Including zero 33.38 5697 21.38 1422 12.00 0.000 
Greater than 0 49.97 3806 46.64 652 3.33 0.000 
Total             
% with zero hours   33%   54%     
Mean hours worked in the last 14 days 
Panel B: Females (16–65)   
Does not 
receive 
remittances N 
Receives 
remittances N 
Diff 
hours 
p-value 
 
Including zero 20.73 5897 17.79 1505 2.95 0.000 
Greater than 0 43.73 2796 40.74 657 2.98 0.002 
Total             
% with zero hours   53%   56%     
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
 
In remittance receiving households 39.5 per cent of men and 54.1 per cent of women aged 
16–65 reported zero hours worked in the last two weeks as compared to 29.1 per cent of 
men and 51.1 per cent of women in households not receiving remittances (Table 2.4). 
Among those who reported non-zero labour hours in the two weeks prior to the survey (Table 
2.5), men and women in remittance receiving households supplied about three hours less 
than those from households that do not receive remittances (the difference is significant at  
1 per cent level). According to Figure 2.3 (see over), there is a larger variation in the number 
of labour hours worked per week in the 14 days before the interview by men and women 
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from the remittance-receiving households. The particularly high variation for men in labour 
hours may be due to remittances providing households with security and allowing them to 
engage in the riskier activities or to wait longer for a better job to come along. 
 
Figure 2.3 Distribution of weekly labour hours (excluding 0) by gender and household 
remittance-receiving status 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003). Age group: 16–65 
 
Table 2.6 Reasons the respondent did not look for work in the last month, ages 16–65 
Main reason did not look for 
job past month 
Males Females 
Does not 
receive 
remittances 
Receives 
remittances Total 
Does not 
receive 
remittances 
Receives 
remittances Total 
Student 28.6 23.9 27.6 9.7 8.6 9.5 
Housewife 23.8 23.2 23.7 72.0 68.0 71.2 
Retired 7.3 8.7 7.6 8.0 9.8 8.4 
Handicapped 6.3 6.9 6.4 2.3 3.0 2.5 
Military 1.7 1.0 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Found job, start late 2.4 1.5 2.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Awaiting recall by employer 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Waiting for busy season 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Do not want to work 6.3 7.1 6.5 2.9 3.5 3.1 
Believe no chance for job 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.0 0.1 
No jobs 18.8 19.3 18.9 4.2 6.3 4.6 
Other 2.2 6.6 3.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 1,440 393 1,833 2,930 779 3,709 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
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Table 2.6 lists the reasons why the respondent did not look for work in the last 30 days by 
gender and household remittance-receiving status. In overall, these reasons are similar 
across households by remittance-receiving status. For both, men and women, the top two 
reasons were ‘student’ and ‘housewife’.3 A higher proportion of men from non-remittance 
receiving households reported that they were students (28.6 vs. 23.8 per cent). About 19 per 
cent of men and 4.6 per cent of women did not look for work because they believed that 
there are ‘no jobs’. 7.6 per cent of men and 8.4 per cent of women were retired.  
 
Non-working males (age group 16–65) in remittance-receiving households are on average 
29.4 years old or 1.7 years older (significant at 5 per cent level) than males from households 
that do not receive remittances. Non-working females (age group 16–65) in the remittance-
receiving households are on average 33.1 years old or 1.2 years older (significant at 5 per 
cent level) than females in the same age group from the households that do not receive 
remittances. 
 
71.0 per cent of men and 47.8 per cent of women in conflict affected areas were working or 
looking for work as compared to 73.6 per cent of men and 52.3 per cent of women in the 
lesser affected areas (the differences are significant at 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively). 
Conditional on employment, men and women in conflict-affected communities worked 1.96 
and 2.79 hours respectively (significant at 1 per cent level) more in the 14 days prior to the 
survey in comparison to men and women in the lesser affected areas.  
 
Thus, the descriptive analysis suggests that there are significant differences in individual’s 
labour force participation and labour hours supplied across both household-remittance 
receiving status and residence in conflict-affected areas. The following section explores the 
channels through which remittances and armed conflict, together and separately, can 
influence individual labour supply. 
 
 
3  Theoretical hypotheses and econometric 
specification  
 
3.1 Theoretical hypotheses  
Remittances can have opposing effects on individual labour supply. In line with previous 
findings in the literature, we expect that an increase in non-wage household income will 
decrease the labour force participation of both men and women. In the neoclassical model of 
labour-leisure choice developed by Killingsworth (1983), remittances can be interpreted as 
non-labour income. Theoretically, an increase in non-labour income should increase 
household purchasing power and reservation wages, therefore reducing the chance of 
employment and the number of hours supplied by remittance-receiving individuals 
(Killingsworth 1983). However, households may initially have to finance the move of 
household members elsewhere in the country or abroad. The initial investment may force 
household members that stayed behind into the workforce if the labour inputs of migrants 
and the labour inputs of those individuals that stay are substitutes (Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo 2006). If remittances sent by migrant household members increase over time or are 
sent on a regular basis, the households can become accustomed to the extra income. It is 
possible that the family members who stayed behind (even those that increased labour 
                                                 
3  The answer category in the English and Russian questionnaires for 2003 and 2007 of the TLSS translates as 
‘housewife’, however this response is a highly peculiar choice for men in Tajikistan. We are planning to obtain 
questionnaires in Tajik to check the accuracy of translation as it is unlikely that Tajik men would refer to themselves or 
other men as housewives. 
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supply initially) may decrease labour participation since increases in non-labour income is 
associated with a rise in reservation wages, and a decrease in the cost of the leisure. This 
impact, however, will depend on the type of labour available and may result in changes in 
patterns of employment (for instance, changes between types of employment or in the 
number of hours in paid work) rather than changes in the decision to work (Amuendo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2006). 
 
What happens among migrant households in conflict affected areas? Exposure to conflict 
increases the likelihood of death, injury and asset loss by household members. The loss of 
household members or injury to workers in the household may be compensated by the 
receipt of remittances. In that case, it is possible that remittances will not yield any effects on 
the labour supply of household members that stayed behind if the level of remittances sent 
by the migrant household member may substitute for the loss of household adult workers. 
Remittances may, however, be accompanied by increases in labour participation if they 
cannot entirely substitute for the loss of income.  
 
Armed conflict may also lead to changes in gender relations as women that would typically 
have stayed at home adopt different roles to cope with the absence of males or changes in 
the structure of society (see Annan et al. 2009). During armed conflict, women often assume 
the role of household heads when adult males volunteer or are forced into armed groups. 
High levels of female-headed households are often observed in communities affected by 
violent conflict (Brück and Schindler 2009; Annan et al. 2009; Bavel and Verwimp 2005). 
These new roles may contribute to changes in women’s preferences and attitudes whereby 
women will be reluctant to leave the labour market for fear of losing their newly found 
autonomy even in response to flows of non-wage income to the household (such as 
remittances).  
 
Conflict may also affect risk perceptions (Voors et al. 2010) and shorten people’s planning 
horizons (Bozzoli and Muller 2010), even in the post-conflict period, due to the danger of 
conflict re-igniting. These factors may provide incentives for people to remain employed even 
if remittances could substitute for wage employment. 
 
3.2 Econometric specification  
We start the analysis of labour market outcomes by estimating key factors that may affect an 
individual’s decision to participate in the labour market. The participation category includes 
individuals who have been employed in the 14 days prior to the 2003 TLSS and individuals 
who were not employed but were actively looking for work (henceforth, ‘workforce 
participation’). We use an OLS model with fixed effects at the raion level to estimate 
Equation 1. 
(1)   ijjiijij uCZRWP  321   
where WPij is a binary variable indicating whether an individual i living in raion j reported to 
be working or looking for work in the last 14 days.4 Ri is the main independent variable, 
measuring the impact of remittances and migration on labour hours supplied by men and 
women in Tajikistan. We make use of the following variables: natural log of annual 
remittances received by a household in Tajikistan, a dummy variable for the household 
having a returned migrant (someone who lived abroad in the last 5 years), a dummy variable 
for the household receiving remittances and the household level number of remitters who live 
abroad or in Tajikistan. These variables are discussed in the next section. Zij is a vector of 
household characteristics, such as age, gender of and years of education completed by 
household head, dependency ratio (number of dependents to number of adults ages 16–65), 
                                                 
4  We also estimated regressions with ‘have worked in the last 14 days’ as a dependent variable and the results are 
similar to those reported for ‘workforce participation’ in Tables 4.1 and 4.3. 
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and household size. Finally, Cj is the vector of community of residence specific 
characteristics that vary at the raion level. 
 
To control for unobserved correlations in the observations within communities, equation (1) is 
estimated with fixed effects at the raion level. Using fixed effects at the raion level allows the 
use of community (primary sampling unit) characteristics that vary within raions, such as 
rural/urban location and proportion of households in the community that have return 
migrants. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors to control for the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity. The fixed-effects model eliminates all observed and unobserved 
community characteristics that are constant across individuals from the same community, 
removing the bias in the estimation of labour supply that is caused by individual-invariant 
community characteristics if these community effects do not interact with household and 
individual characteristics. Since it is possible that some unobservable data on local 
characteristics, such as availability of jobs, are correlated with the remittances (particularly in 
communities more affected by the armed conflict), the fixed effects specification helps us to 
control for this correlation. It is assumed that there are no omitted time-varying and region 
specific effects correlated with the remittances. If there are such omitted variables and they 
are positively correlated with remittances, then the estimate of 1 will be lower in the absolute 
value, and the impact of remittances on labour supply will be underestimated. 
 
One of the challenges in migration research is that some factors that affect migration and 
remittance decisions may also influence labour market decisions of those who stay behind. 
For example, people may migrate away from areas with poor labour market conditions. In the 
case of conflict, people may migrate from areas where infrastructure was most destroyed 
and the likelihood of further investment in local industry and other forms of employment is 
lower. This joint determination causes explanatory variables that measure migration and 
remittances to be correlated with the error term when we use a standard OLS approach. 
Some of the studies mentioned above use an instrumental variables approach to address 
this problem. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) used per capita count of Western Union 
offices in the Mexican states interacted with household level education characteristics to 
increase variability of the instrument at the household level. Damon (2006) used community 
level migration and variables correlated with remittances to tackle this problem. In the case of 
Tajikistan, some of the potential instruments that are available to us from the data, such as 
the size of Tajik migrant networks abroad, can also affect the labour supply of household 
members who stay at home. We think therefore that it is more appropriate to included these 
variables in the main equations rather than use them as instruments.5  
 
As a robustness check, we also estimate regressions where the dependent variable is the 
number of labour hours supplied in the last 14 days. We use a Tobit model to estimate the 
relationship between the amount of remittances received by a household and the supply of 
labour hours by individual household members. The Tobit model allows us to account for the 
zero-values of labour hours.  
 
We estimate the following equation for the labour hours regression:  
(2)  ijjijiij vCZRY   210   
 with ),0(~ 2 Normali  and  
 ),0max( *ijij YY  , 
                                                 
5  We also estimated an instrumental variables model using the migrant network size as an instrument for ln(remittances). 
The results are strong and the effect of remittances on the labour force participation by males is significantly higher (the 
estimated coefficient =-0.0697; significant at 1 per cent level) than in the OLS regression (-0.0146; significant at 5 per 
cent level) results of which are presented in Section 4. Thus, the results presented are conservative estimates of the 
effect of remittances on individual labour supply in Tajikistan. 
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where Yij is the number of labour hours worked in the last week by a household member 
aged 16–65. The variables in vectors Ri , Zij and Cj are the same as those listed above. The 
regressions are estimated separately for men and women. All regressions are estimated 
using a Tobit model with random effects specified at the raion level to account for the effects 
that may be common for all individuals who live in the same raion.  
 
3.3 Measures of remittances, migration and conflict 
We use three measures of remittances to account for possible measurement error in the self-
reporting of the amount of remittances received. The first measure is the natural logarithm of 
the amount of remittances received by the household in the past 12 months. The second is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if a household receives remittances. The third measure 
is a set of two variables that represent the number of donors (family members and other 
relatives) who live in Tajikistan or abroad. These variables include all donors that a 
household identified as sending remittances, including those donors for whom the household 
failed to provide the amount received. The last two measures should capture a possible 
recall bias and measurement error in the amount of remittances received reported by the 
households as some households may not recall all remittance receipts or fail to estimate the 
total amount correctly. 
 
In addition to measuring the direct impact of remittances, we explore the effect of having a 
former migrant in the household on individual labour supply. As we do not have information 
on the household members who are currently abroad for work-related migration, a dummy 
variable is created that is equal to one if a household has ‘a former labour migrant currently 
living in the household’ that is not an individual him/herself. Having a migrant in a household 
may have a positive or negative effect on the individual labour supply. The direction of the 
effect would be determined by the complementarity or substitutability of the labour effort of 
those who stayed behind and that of migrants as discussed previously.  
 
Some households are expected to have either access to remittances or some expectation of 
future remittances if there are many former migrants in the community. To proxy for that, we 
use a variable that denotes ‘a proportion of households in the community that have a former 
labour migrant’. Remittances can be brought back by neighbours and household members 
who are heading home for good. As explained above, remittances are expected to negatively 
affect individual labour supply. Also, former migrants may have higher reservation wages and 
thus either they would not work for a lower pay or would wait until they can migrate again.6 7  
 
We acknowledge the fact that even if a negative effect of access to migrant network on the 
labour supply is found, it would be difficult to attribute this effect specifically to remittances. A 
large size of a migration network in the sending community may also signal a weak local 
labour market or indicate a small workforce in the community. These two factors will have an 
opposite impact on the labour supply of the remaining household members. In the first case, 
they may stay at home as they will rely more on the support of migrants. In the second case, 
they may be pulled into workforce by higher wages or based on the need to contribute to the 
                                                 
6  Between 1998 and 2003, an average monthly wage in Tajikistan was between 7 and 21 USD, and an average wage in 
Russia was between 66 and 306 U.S. dollars (IMF 2001, 2005). 
7  A third (164 out of 483, or 34 per cent) of former male migrants indicated they were neither working or had looked for a 
job in the past 30 days. 25.0 per cent indicated that they are "housewives", 20.1 per cent - that there were no jobs, 20.1 
per cent – ‘other reason’, 12.2 per cent said that they do not want to work and 6.7 per cent said that they were in school. 
Among the 49 former female migrants, 22 did not work or look for work at the time of the survey. Among them 81 per 
cent were housewives, and the rest indicated that they were either in school or did not want to work (the number is 
equally split between the two categories).  
We also estimated an effect of an individual being a former migrant on their workforce participation while controlling for 
other covariates. A large negative effect of this variable was found on labour force participation. Males who migrated 
abroad for at least 3 months since 1998 were 13.6 percentage points less likely to participate in the labour market 
(significant at 1 per cent level) than males who did not migrate in the past 5 years. The effect of past migration on the 
workforce participation of women is positive but not statistically significant (results not reported). 
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local labour market. It is still common in Tajikistan, especially in the rural-cotton growing 
areas to call people into agricultural work at the collective farms when the need arises.  
 
The TLSS provides valuable information on individual migration within Tajikistan and on 
periods of time individuals aged 14 and above lived outside Tajikistan. Based on this data, 
6.4 per cent of a total of 16,847 individuals reported that they lived abroad for 3 months or 
more between 1998 and 2003. On average, they spent 11.7 months abroad. Over 95 per 
cent of such migrants report going abroad to look for a better paid job or start a business 
(89.1 and 5.8 per cent, respectively). To construct a variable that serves as a proxy for the 
migrant network outside of Tajikistan, we divided the number of households that have at 
least one household member who lived abroad for at least three months between 1998 and 
2003 by the number of surveyed households (usually 20) in each primary sampling unit. A 
similar variable was used by Damon (2007, 2010) and Acosta (2006) to proxy for the size of 
migrant network.  
 
The impact of remittances and access to migrant networks on individual labour supply is 
expected to be greater in conflict affected areas. As mentioned above, mass out-migration 
first occurred from the conflict affected areas. Thus, although these areas were affected by 
the war to a greater extent, individuals who lived there had greater access to the migrant 
networks abroad in the post-conflict period. Recent research suggests that such individuals 
who had access to an established migrant network in the migrant-receiving countries are 
more likely to have access to jobs or earn higher wages than individuals who did not have 
access to such networks (Munshi 2003; Beaman 2009). It is also possible that since the 
migration for work from these regions started earlier, households were able to adjust their 
labour supply over time at different rates in comparison to those living in communities less 
affected by the conflict. 
 
To investigate the impact of living in the areas affected by armed conflict and the possible 
changes in the labour market environment, we introduce a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if an area was severely affected by civil war events in 1992–1998. The assignment of the 
raion to the group that was more or less severely affected by the conflict is based on the 
analysis of reports of conflict related events by major Tajikistan newspapers, reports 
published by various non-governmental organizations and the U.S. Department of State. The 
variable is equal to one if the above mentioned sources reported that a particular raion 
experienced a repeated abuse of civilians, a large number of conflict-related deaths, 
bombing or was a place of the major battles during the war. The variable is described in 
more detail in Shemyakina (forthcoming). 
 
 
4  Empirical results 
 
4.1 OLS regressions – workforce participation 
Table 4.1 reports results of the OLS regressions where the dependent variable is whether an 
individual has participated in the work force in the 14 days prior to the survey. The 
regressions are estimated with fixed effects at the raion level to control for factors that are 
constant at the raion level, for example, labour market structures.  
 
Column 1 in Table 4.1 presents the results from the base model. The estimated coefficients 
on explanatory variables have the expected signs. Married men/women are more/less likely 
to be in the workforce. Labour force participation increases with age, and is higher for more 
educated people and those who live in rural areas. Rural men and rural women are more 
likely to participate in the labour force (9.2 and 21.6 percentage points, respectively, 
significant at 1 per cent level). Women and men from larger households are less likely to be 
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employed. The estimated coefficients on the dummy for a female household head and 
dependency ratio are not statistically significant. The results show further that non-labour 
income has a negative and significant impact on labour force participation of men and has a 
positive but not significant impact on the labour supply of women.  
 
In Columns 2–6 we test the impact of our remittance and migration variables on the labour 
supply of men and women in Tajikistan. The estimated coefficients on the dummy variable 
for household receiving remittances and the natural logarithm of annual remittances are 
negative and statistically significant for both men and women (Columns 2 and 3). The effect 
of both variables is higher for men. Men living in remittance-receiving households have 7.6 
percentage points lower workforce participation rate as compared to men who live in 
households that do not receive remittances. Women from remittance-receiving households 
are 4.9 percentage points less likely to participate in the labour market. Both effects are 
significant at 1 per cent level.  
 
Individuals from households who have family members and relatives abroad and in Tajikistan 
who remit money are also less likely to participate in the labour force. The effect is higher for 
men than for women (Column 4). Male workforce participation declines by 5.4 percentage 
points for each donor who lives abroad. Each additional donor living abroad reduces 
women’s workforce participation by 3.9 percentage points. The estimated coefficients for 
having an additional donor who lives abroad or in Tajikistan (Column 4) are not statistically 
different from each other in the regressions for both men and women. However, we present 
separate results for donors who live in Tajikistan and abroad, so we can compare the 
estimated coefficients on the variable denoting number of donors who live abroad at the 
present time (Column 4)8 and on the dummy variable for household having a former migrant 
who lived abroad (that is not an individual him/herself) for more than 3 months between 1998 
and 2003 (Column 5). The results in Column 5 suggest that past migration of other 
household members has no significant impact on the decision to participate in the labour 
market for men and women. Thus, current access to remittances has a greater impact on the 
labour supply of individuals than household access to remittances in the past.  
 
Column 6 presents results from a model that includes a proxy for the access of the 
household to a network of migrants in the community (henceforth, migrant network). The 
estimated coefficient on this variable in the regressions for men is almost three times greater 
than the estimated coefficient in the regressions for women. A one percent increase in the 
proportion of households in the community that have former migrants decreases labour force 
participation of men and women by 1.77 and 0.67 percentage points respectively. The result 
is however only statistically significant for men. 
 
In line with other findings in the relevant literature surveyed in Section 1, we observe that 
remittances have a significant negative impact in the participation of men and women in the 
labour market. The impact on female labour market participation is however smaller than the 
impact on male labour participation. This result contradicts previous findings that report a 
larger negative impact of remittances – and other non-labour income – on female labour 
market participation. 
 
                                                 
8  We use an actual number of donors instead of dummy variables for having a donor because the actual number allows 
us to exploit a variation in the number of donors in the analysis. Replacing the number of donors abroad or in Tajikistan 
with dummy variables for household having a donor abroad or in Tajikistan does not affect the significance of the 
estimates. In the regressions for males, the estimated coefficients on the dummy terms for household having a donor 
abroad is -0.685 and for having a donor in Tajikistan is -0.702. Both are significant at 1 per cent level. In the regressions 
for women, the estimated coefficients are -0.0515 (significant at 1% level) and -0.0486 (significant at 5 per cent level) 
respectively. 
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Table 4.1 OLS models. Dependent variable: workforce participation in the last 14 days 
 
  
Panel A: Men 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years of education 
completed 
0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Married 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Rural 0.092*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Household size -0.004** -0.004** -0.004* -0.004** -0.004* -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dependents (under 
16+66&above)/Adults 16–
65) 
0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.003 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Household head is female -0.029 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.029 -0.031 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
ln(nonwage income) -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
HH receives remittances 
from hh members&other 
relatives 
 -0.076***     
 (0.017)     
Ln total remittances 
received by household 
  -0.012***    
  (0.003)    
N of relatives-donors who 
live abroad 
   -0.054**   
   (0.025)   
N of relatives-donors who 
live in Tajikistan 
   -0.051***   
   (0.015)   
Migrant in a household (not 
him/herself) 
    -0.011  
    (0.016)  
Proportion of households 
with migrants in psu 
     -0.177*** 
     (0.044) 
Constant -0.425*** -0.398*** -0.399*** -0.407*** -0.422*** -0.410*** 
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) 
N 6486 6486 6486 6486 6486 6486 
R squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 
Note: * significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01, *** significant at 0.001 level. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects at 
the raion level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
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Table 4.1 (continued) OLS models. Dependent variable: workforce participation in the 
last 14 days 
 
  
Panel B: Women 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years of education 
completed 
0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Married -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.130*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Rural 0.216*** 0.211*** 0.210*** 0.211*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) 
Household size -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dependents (under 
16+66&above)/Adults 16–
65) 
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Household head is female 0.034 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.034 0.034 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
ln(nonwage income) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
HH receives remittances 
from hh members&other 
relatives 
 -0.049***     
 (0.015)     
Ln total remittances 
received by household 
  -0.009***    
  (0.002)    
N of relatives-donors who 
live abroad 
   -0.039***   
   (0.015)   
N of relatives-donors who 
live in Tajikistan 
   -0.035**   
   (0.014)   
Migrant in a household (not 
him/herself) 
    -0.016  
    (0.018)  
Proportion of households 
with migrants in psu 
     -0.067 
     (0.044) 
Constant -0.716*** -0.705*** -0.704*** -0.705*** -0.714*** -0.713*** 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
N 7159 7159 7159 7159 7159 7159 
R squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 
Note: * significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01, *** significant at 0.001 level. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects at 
the raion level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003)
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4.2 Tobit regressions – labour hours supply 
Table 4.2 reports results from Tobit regressions where the dependent variable is the number 
of hours worked by an individual in the 14 days prior to the survey. In the regressions 
presented, we control for various family and individual characteristics, such as age, 
education level, household size, proportion of households in the community that have 
migrants who lived abroad in the last 5 years. As before, we also control for the set of 
migration and remittance variables discussed previously: the natural logarithm of the total 
amount of remittances sent by household members and relatives, a dummy variable 
indicating whether a household has received remittances from a relative or a household 
member in the last 12 months, a dummy variable for the household having a returned 
migrant (someone who lived abroad in the past 5 years) and the proportion of households in 
the community that have at least one returned migrant. The results are reported separately 
for men and women in the 16–65 age range. 
 
The sign and significance of the estimated regression coefficients on the set of control 
variables in Table 4.2 are similar to the ones we observed in the previous regression 
estimates reported in Table 4.1. The number of labour hours supplied increases with age, 
education and residence in the rural area. Women from larger households supply fewer 
hours of work. Married men/women work longer/shorter hours respectively. Non-wage 
income has a significant negative impact on the labour hours supplied by men and no 
significant effect on the hours supplied by women. 
 
The estimated coefficients reported in Table 4.3 (page 28) on the three measures of 
remittances are almost two times larger for men than for women (Columns 2, 3 and 4). 
Having a former migrant in the household reduces hours of work supplied by women, but not 
by men (Column 5). As before, the number of labour hours supplied by men and women are 
highly negatively affected by the size of the migrant network in the community. The estimated 
coefficient is almost three times greater in the regressions for men.  
 
The main difference between Tables 4.1 and 4.2 is the impact of having a former migrant in 
the household (Column 5). Similar to the results in Table 4.1, this variable has no statistically 
significant impact on the number of labour hours supplied by men, but has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the number of labour hours supplied by women. The results 
suggest that women from households with former migrants may not stop working but are 
more likely to reduce their number of hours worked. 
 
The estimates reported on the other remittance variables in Table 4.2 confirm the results 
discussed in the previous section: remittances have a stronger effect the labour supply of 
men than that of women. This is a puzzling result as previous literature on impact of 
remittances on labour supply has consistently found that women’s labour supply is more 
elastic to the receipt of remittances than the labour supply of men. One possible explanation 
for this result may lie in the civil war that took place in Tajikistan a few years before the 
survey, and that resulted in substantial increases in migration outflows from Tajikistan. In the 
next section, we test for the joint impact of remittances and impact of the armed conflict on 
individual labour supply. 
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Table 4.2 Tobit models. Dependent variable: hours worked in the last 14 days 
 
  
Panel A: Men 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age 3.028*** 2.990*** 2.989*** 3.004*** 3.031*** 2.996*** 
 (0.193) (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) (0.193) (0.192) 
Age squared -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years of education 
completed 
0.270* 0.262* 0.269* 0.274* 0.269* 0.269* 
(0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) 
Married 6.105*** 6.181*** 6.165*** 6.091*** 6.104*** 6.313*** 
 (1.084) (1.080) (1.081) (1.081) (1.084) (1.078) 
Rural 6.370*** 5.825*** 5.865*** 6.030*** 6.372*** 6.301*** 
 (1.184) (1.182) (1.183) (1.182) (1.184) (1.174) 
Household size -0.127 -0.123 -0.111 -0.108 -0.132 -0.014 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.104) (0.102) 
Dependents (under 
16+66&above)/Adults 16–
65) 
-0.033 -0.014 -0.067 -0.043 -0.019 -0.409 
(0.552) (0.550) (0.550) (0.551) (0.556) (0.551) 
Household head is female -1.878* -1.631 -1.651* -1.711* -1.878* -2.064** 
 (1.001) (0.998) (0.998) (0.999) (1.001) (0.996) 
ln(nonwage income) -0.807*** -0.768*** -0.767*** -0.765*** -0.806*** -0.826*** 
 (0.255) (0.254) (0.254) (0.255) (0.255) (0.254) 
HH receives remittances 
from hh members&other 
relatives 
 -5.807***     
 (0.875)     
Ln total remittances 
received by household 
  -0.895***    
  (0.142)    
N of relatives-donors who 
live abroad 
   -4.458***   
   (0.929)   
N of relatives-donors who 
live in Tajikistan 
   -2.932***   
   (0.822)   
Migrant in a household (not 
him/herself) 
    0.242  
    (1.025)  
Proportion of households 
with migrants in psu 
     -17.739*** 
     (2.065) 
Constant -28.718*** -26.723*** -26.937*** -27.543*** -28.772*** -27.411*** 
 (3.532) (3.530) (3.530) (3.525) (3.539) (3.500) 
Constant- sigma_u 9.295*** 9.199*** 9.206*** 9.201*** 9.301*** 8.887*** 
 (0.925) (0.916) (0.916) (0.916) (0.926) (0.888) 
Constant- sigma_e 25.502*** 25.417*** 25.425*** 25.436*** 25.502*** 25.367*** 
 (0.225) (0.224) (0.224) (0.224) (0.225) (0.224) 
N 6491 6491 6491 6491 6491 6491 
chi2 1081.9 1133.2 1128.4 1122.3 1082.0 1167.6 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: * significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01, *** significant at 0.001 level. All regressions are estimated with random effects 
at the raion level. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
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Table 4.2 (continued) Tobit models. Dependent variable: hours worked in the last 14 
days 
 
  
Panel B: Women 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age 2.992*** 3.000*** 2.998*** 2.995*** 2.991*** 2.993*** 
 (0.160) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) 
Age squared -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years of education 
completed 
0.556*** 0.544*** 0.546*** 0.546*** 0.553*** 0.550*** 
(0.143) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
Married -7.291*** -7.285*** -7.266*** -7.275*** -7.165*** -7.142*** 
 (0.750) (0.749) (0.749) (0.750) (0.752) (0.751) 
Rural 11.739*** 11.482*** 11.464*** 11.527*** 11.725*** 11.771*** 
 (1.027) (1.028) (1.029) (1.029) (1.027) (1.027) 
Household size -0.248*** -0.244*** -0.236*** -0.232*** -0.211** -0.206** 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) 
Dependents (under 
16+66&above)/Adults 16-
65) 
-0.296 -0.286 -0.314 -0.313 -0.397 -0.407 
(0.430) (0.429) (0.429) (0.430) (0.432) (0.431) 
Household head is female 0.749 0.937 0.946 0.916 0.769 0.75 
 (0.795) (0.795) (0.795) (0.796) (0.795) (0.794) 
ln(nonwage income) 0.173 0.189 0.189 0.181 0.162 0.156 
 (0.224) (0.223) (0.223) (0.224) (0.224) (0.224) 
HH receives remittances 
from hh members&other 
relatives 
 -2.968***     
 (0.719)     
Ln total remittances 
received by household 
  -0.481***    
  (0.116)    
N of relatives-donors who 
live abroad 
   -2.337***   
   (0.767)   
N of relatives-donors who 
live in Tajikistan 
   -1.471**   
   (0.697)   
Migrant in a household (not 
him/herself) 
    -1.737**  
    (0.744)  
Proportion of households 
with migrants in psu 
     -5.943*** 
     (1.746) 
Constant -39.153*** -38.500*** -38.530*** -38.676*** -39.010*** -38.959*** 
 (2.884) (2.885) (2.884) (2.885) (2.884) (2.882) 
Constant- sigma_u 7.968*** 7.961*** 7.953*** 7.958*** 7.978*** 7.957*** 
 (0.797) (0.795) (0.794) (0.795) (0.797) (0.795) 
Constant- sigma_e 23.577*** 23.548*** 23.549*** 23.555*** 23.567*** 23.558*** 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) 
N 7161 7161 7161 7161 7160 7161 
chi2 622.5 640.9 641.0 636.9 628.5 635.1 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: * significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01, *** significant at 0.001 level. All regressions are estimated with random effects 
at the raion level. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003)
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4.3 Labour supply and conflict exposure 
Table 4.3 reports results where migration and remittance variables are interacted with a 
dummy for a household living in the conflict-affected area. The results indicate that men and 
women living in households that receive remittances and who also live in conflict affected 
regions are significantly less likely to participate in the labour market as compared to men 
and women from households that receive remittances and live in the lesser affected areas 
(Column 1). The direction of effect is the same for men and women, but the magnitude is 
higher for men (Table 4.3, Panels A and B, Column 1). 
 
The amount of remittances received (Column 2) and a number of remitters to household who 
live abroad (Column 3) have a strong negative impact on the labour supply of males (but not 
females) in the more conflict affected areas. We do not observe a statistically significant 
impact of any other migration variable on the labour market participation of men or women in 
conflict affected areas. We obtain similar results in the estimation of Tobit models with the 
number of labour hours as a dependent variable. The estimation results suggest that the 
negative impact of remittances on the number of hours supplied by men is greater in the 
conflict affected areas (Table 4.4, Panel A, Column 1–3), while the impact of remittances on 
labour supply of women is greater in the lesser affected areas (Table 4.4, Panel B, Column 
1–3). As in Table 4.3, the migration variables do not have any statistically significant impact 
on the number of labour hours supplied by women in conflict affected communities.  
 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 (pages 28 and 31) suggest two important results. First, the impact of 
remittances of the labour market participation of both men and women is more strongly 
affected in areas that were previously more exposed to fighting during the 1992–1998 civil 
war. We believe that this result follows from the timing of the process of out-migration in 
Tajikistan, which started much earlier in the areas more affected by the civil war. People 
started to migrate after the outbreak of violence from areas that were likely to experience 
more fighting. Only afterwards did migration outflows increased in other areas of Tajikistan, 
as the benefits of remittances started to be recognized more widely. The negative impact we 
observe on individual labour participation and work hours supplied in conflict areas indicates 
a possible substitution effect between wages and remittances in these areas. We suspect 
that the lack of significant effects of remittances on the labour market participation of 
individuals in areas less affected by the civil war indicate the short-term experience of 
migration in these areas.  
 
Our second and most puzzling result is that the impact of remittances on the labour market 
participation of men is much more significant than that of women in conflict affected areas. In 
fact, the labour market participation of women in conflict areas seems to respond hardly at all 
to flows of remittances. We suggest some possible explanations, most related to possible 
critical changes in social structures after the civil war. First, women in conflict affected areas 
remain employed because either they do not want to leave the labour market or because 
they cannot. The civil war in Tajikistan – as other civil wars – may have resulted in an 
increase of female labour market participation to replace for the loss in male labour (when  
men joined armed forces or were killed). Some of these women may not be willing to return 
to their homes into their traditional roles even in the event of additional household income. 
Women who joined the labour force during the civil war in Tajikistan are likely to have faced 
difficulties when joining paid work as this was not very common. So once they have paid the 
fixed costs of entering the labour market, such as convincing their families and their 
husbands’ families or convincing employers in accepting them, they may be unwilling to 
leave. This explanation is very plausible in the context of Tajikistan where in 2003 less than 
50 per cent of women reported working in the last 14 days. A similar effect of permanent 
attachment to the labour force was found by Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004) who studied 
the effect of female labour supply on the wage structure in the United States after the World 
War II. Further, Majbouri (2009) in his study of women’ workforce participation in Iran has 
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Table 4.3 OLS models. Dependent variable: workforce participation in the last 14 days 
The effect of living in the conflict affected area 
 
  
Panel A: Men 
1 2 3 4 5 
HH receives remittances from hh 
members&other relatives 
-0.02     
(0.021)     
RCA * HH receives remittances from hh 
members&other relatives 
-0.103***     
(0.029)     
Ln total remittances received by household  -0.002    
 (0.004)    
RCA * Ln total remittances received by 
household 
 -0.018***    
 (0.005)    
N of relatives-donors who live abroad   0.016   
  (0.024)   
RCA* N of relatives-donors who live abroad   -0.119***   
  (0.041)   
N of relatives-donors who live in Tajikistan   -0.026   
  (0.034)   
RCA * N of relatives-donors who live in 
Tajikistan 
  -0.035   
  (0.036)   
Migrant in a household (not him/herself)    -0.021  
   (0.026)  
RCA * Migrant in a household (not 
him/herself) 
   0.015  
   (0.032)  
Proportion of households with migrants in 
psu 
    -0.119* 
    (0.069) 
RCA* Proportion of households with 
migrants in psu 
    -0.077 
    (0.087) 
Constant -0.394*** -0.396*** -0.407*** -0.422*** -0.409*** 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) 
N 6486 6486 6486 6486 6486 
R squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 
 
Note: * significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01, *** significant at 0.001 level. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects at 
the raion level. All regressions include the full set of household and individual level control variables as in Table 4.1, Col. 1. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
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Table 4.3 (continued) OLS models. Dependent variable: workforce participation in the 
last 14 days 
The effect of living in the conflict affected area 
 
  
Panel B: Women 
1 2 3 4 5 
HH receives remittances from hh 
members&other relatives 
-0.021     
(0.021)     
RCA * HH receives remittances from hh 
members&other relatives 
-0.047*     
(0.026)     
Ln total remittances received by household  -0.004    
 (0.003)    
RCA * Ln total remittances received by 
household 
 -0.007    
 (0.004)    
N of relatives-donors who live abroad   -0.039**   
  (0.018)   
RCA* N of relatives-donors who live abroad   0.001   
  (0.028)   
N of relatives-donors who live in Tajikistan   -0.001   
  (0.025)   
RCA * N of relatives-donors who live in 
Tajikistan 
  -0.045   
  (0.028)   
Migrant in a household (not him/herself)    -0.019  
   (0.033)  
RCA * Migrant in a household (not 
him/herself) 
   0.004  
   (0.037)  
Proportion of households with migrants in 
psu 
    -0.054 
    (0.074) 
RCA* Proportion of households with 
migrants in psu 
    -0.017 
    (0.090) 
Constant -0.703*** -0.703*** -0.704*** -0.714*** -0.713*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
N 7159 7159 7159 7159 7159 
R squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
 
Note: * significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01, *** significant at 0.001 level. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects at 
the raion level. All regressions include the full set of household and individual level control variables. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
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found that urban married women were reluctant to exit the labour market even when the real 
wages fell by 16 per cent given the difficulties they faced in joining the labour market in the 
first place.  
 
Another explanation is that remittances in households where women work may not be 
sufficient to compensate for a loss of wages if women remove themselves from the labour 
market. These may well be poorer households or simply receive lower amounts of 
remittances. Testing this hypothesis has found that the differences in consumption 
expenditure between households that receive remittances and those that do not are small 
and insignificant (294 and 297 somoni respectively). Additionally there is not much difference 
observed in the distribution of expenditures by deciles across household remittance-receiving 
status. Alternatively, there could be an issue with respect to who controls the distribution of 
remittances. If women do not have access to them, then we should not observe changes in 
the labour supply of women in response to remittances. Unfortunately available data does 
not allow us to test this hypothesis further.  
 
Another set of possible explanations is related to conflict-induced changes in individual 
attitudes and preferences towards risk: the lower response of women’s labour supply to 
remittances may have to do with women in conflict areas being more risk averse. Because 
they were exposed to conflict, some women may be afraid of what can happen in the future 
and therefore remain in the labour market making the average response of women's labour 
supply less elastic than that of men. There is a large literature that studies economic decision 
making and risk attitudes of men and women, suggesting that women are more risk averse 
than men with respect to making investments and thus they earn lower returns. Ammon 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find that single women invest a smaller fraction of their 
wealth in the riskier assets than single men of comparable economic status. Sunden and 
Surette (1998) also support such finding of higher risk aversion by women, while Schubert et 
al. (1999) suggest that risk preferences of men and women depend of the specific setting of 
financial goals. At the moment there is no data available to test this hypothesis explicitly in 
the case of Tajikistan as this would require an experimental research design. This area of 
research should be explored for further work on individual behaviour in conflict settings. For 
instance, Voors et al. (2010) have reported significant changes in tastes, preferences and 
risk aversion in conflict situations.  
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Table 4.4 Tobit models. Dependent variable: hours worked in the last 14 days 
Testing for the joint effect of remittances and migration in the conflict affected areas  
 
  
Panel A: Men 
1 2 3 4 5 
HH receives remittances from hh 
members&other relatives 
-4.015***     
(1.283)     
RCA * HH receives remittances from hh 
members&other relatives 
-3.300*     
(1.729)     
Ln total remittances received by household  -0.551**    
 (0.214)    
RCA * Ln total remittances received by 
household 
 -0.605**    
 (0.282)    
N of relatives-donors who live abroad   -2.651*   
  (1.426)   
RCA* N of relatives-donors who live abroad   -3.120*   
  (1.868)   
N of relatives-donors who live in Tajikistan   -2.879*   
  (1.517)   
RCA * N of relatives-donors who live in 
Tajikistan 
  -0.056   
  (1.796)   
Migrant in a household (not him/herself)    0.096  
   (1.668)  
RCA * Migrant in a household (not 
him/herself) 
   0.229  
   (2.058)  
Proportion of households with migrants in 
psu 
    -24.986*** 
    (4.098) 
RCA* Proportion of households with 
migrants in psu 
    9.600** 
    (4.690) 
Constant -26.582*** -26.808*** -27.543*** -28.767*** -27.427*** 
 (3.529) (3.528) (3.525) (3.540) (3.499) 
Constant- sigma_u 9.182*** 9.193*** 9.205*** 9.302*** 8.880*** 
 (0.914) (0.915) (0.916) (0.926) (0.888) 
Constant- sigma_e 25.411*** 25.416*** 25.430*** 25.502*** 25.359*** 
 (0.224) (0.224) (0.224) (0.225) (0.224) 
N 6491 6491 6491 6491 6491 
chi2 1137.5 1133.8 1125.6 1082.0 1172.5 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: * significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01, *** significant at 0.001 level. All regressions are estimated with random effects 
at the raion level. All regressions include a full set of individual and household controls as in Table 4.2 Col. 1. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
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Table 4.4 (continued) Tobit models. Dependent variable: hours worked in the last 14 
days  
Testing for the joint effect of remittances and migration in the conflict affected areas 
 
  
Panel B: Women 
1 2 3 4 5 
HH receives remittances from hh 
members&other relatives 
-2.172*     
(1.115)     
RCA * HH receives remittances from hh 
members&other relatives 
-1.342     
(1.436)     
Ln total remittances received by household  -0.351*    
 (0.186)    
RCA * Ln total remittances received by 
household 
 -0.21    
 (0.235)    
N of relatives-donors who live abroad   -3.274***   
  (1.193)   
RCA* N of relatives-donors who live abroad   1.629   
  (1.545)   
N of relatives-donors who live in Tajikistan   0.222   
  (1.355)   
RCA * N of relatives-donors who live in 
Tajikistan 
  -2.298   
  (1.568)   
Migrant in a household (not him/herself)    -1.989  
   (1.256)  
RCA * Migrant in a household (not 
him/herself) 
   0.38  
   (1.524)  
Proportion of households with migrants in 
psu 
    -8.012** 
    (3.561) 
RCA* Proportion of households with 
migrants in psu 
    2.685 
    (4.027) 
Constant -38.436*** -38.475*** -38.599*** -39.006*** -38.979*** 
 (2.885) (2.884) (2.886) (2.885) (2.882) 
Constant- sigma_u 7.942*** 7.937*** 7.976*** 7.979*** 7.957*** 
 (0.793) (0.793) (0.797) (0.797) (0.796) 
Constant- sigma_e 23.547*** 23.548*** 23.549*** 23.566*** 23.557*** 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) 
N 7161 7161 7161 7160 7161 
chi2 641.9 641.9 640.5 628.5 635.6 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: * significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01, *** significant at 0.001 level. All regressions are estimated with random effects 
at the raion level. All regressions include a full set of individual and household controls as in Table 4.2 Col. 1. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
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5  Discussion 
 
In this paper we estimate the impact of remittances on the labour supply of working age men 
and women in post-conflict Tajikistan. Similarly to previous literature, we find that the amount 
of remittances received by a household has an overall negative impact on the number of 
labour hours supplied by men and women aged 16–65. We find however that the effect of 
remittances is stronger for men than for women. This is an intriguing result as previous 
research on the effects of remittances on labour supply has shown that female labour supply 
is typically more responsive to changes in remittances (Funkhouser 1992; Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo 2006; Hanson 2007). This result may be due to the timing of the process of labour-
migration in Tajikistan, where migration outside of Tajikistan first occurred from the conflict 
affected areas and where most of the labour migrants were men. Thus men may reduce their 
labour supply in the local market as they expect to migrate in the near future. The regression 
results where we include a dummy variable for an individual being a former labour migrant 
support this interpretation.  
 
When considering the joint impact of conflict and migration, we find that remittances have a 
negative and significant effect on the labour supply of males in conflict affected areas, but no 
significant effect on the labour supply by women in those areas. We suggest that this effect 
may be caused by changes in attitudes and preferences of individuals – particularly women – 
during the conflict period. Although the data we have available does not allow us to test 
directly for the channels underlying this result, we suggest two possible explanations. The 
first is that women in the conflict affected areas entered the workforce in response to the 
needs of the households and the demand for labour in the local labour markets. These 
women remained employed even after the conflict ended because the fixed costs of joining 
the labour market in the first place were sufficiently high. Thus, many women may have been 
permanently drawn into the workforce.  
 
The second explanation for the lower impact of remittances on female labour supply is that 
women may be more risk averse. By maintaining their jobs and thereby access to wages, 
women diversify their sources of income. We are not able to test this hypothesis with the 
data available, nor is there any other research available that has looked at whether women 
and men will differ in terms of economic decision-making in politically unstable environments, 
suggesting a promising area for future research. 
 
The results presented in the paper offer two important contributions to the development 
economics literature. Firstly, the results show strong evidence for the differential way in 
which men and women respond to remittances and migration of household members with 
respect to their labour supply decisions. This provides further evidence for the importance of 
research on intra-household decision-making processes, as well as the impact of gender-
differentiated behaviour on economic outcomes. Secondly, the study illustrates how 
migration and conflict taken together may affect individual labour supply by gender. Analyses 
using only remittances or only conflict data would provide an incomplete picture of the labour 
supply decisions. Although the paper does not offer a general equilibrium labour supply 
model, it does provide empirical evidence for the need for further research on how 
households respond to multiple events. 
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Appendix 1 Construction of labour hours 
variable 
 
We use the following survey questions to determine whether an individual was currently 
employed (during the last 14 days), type of employment and to calculate the number of 
weekly hours supplied in the past 14 days.  
 
A) Definition of ‘currently employed status’ is based on the affirmative answer questions 1, 2 
or 3 in Module 5, Part A (as listed below) indicates that an individual was employed during 
the last 14 days. 
 
Module 5: Labour: Part A: Labour force participation 
1. During the past 14 days, have you worked for someone who is not a member of your 
household, for example, a public or private enterprise or company, an NGO or any other 
individual?  
2. During the past 14 days, have you worked on a farm owned or rented by you or a member 
of your household, whether in cultivating crops or in other farm maintenance tasks, or have 
you cared for livestock belonging to you or a member of your household?  
3. During the past 14 days, have you worked on your own account or in a business 
enterprise belonging to you or someone in your household, for example, as a trader, shop-
keeper, barber, dressmaker, carpenter, taxi driver, car wash, etc.?  
 
B) The number of hours worked and the type of enterprise/employer is found from Module 5, 
Section B, questions 3 and 5.  
Module 5, Section B: ‘Overview last 14 days’ 
a) information on the characteristics of the employer: 
 
Question 3: ‘In this work were you working for:’ 
1. farm owned or rented by household member 
2. own account/household enterprise 
3. work for non-household member 
 
b) The actual number of hours worked  
Question 5: ‘How many hours a week in the last 14 days did you do this activity?’ 
 
Table A1 Individual summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Working or looking for work in the last 14 days 13903 0.60 0.49   
Hours worked in the last 14 days 14521 25.45 28.38 0 168 
Age 14521 32.71 13.03 16 65 
Educational Level 13652 10.87 2.24 0 19 
Married 14521 0.62 0.49   
Female 14521 0.51 0.50   
Source: Authors’ calculations using TLSS (2003) 
 35 
 
References 
 
Acemoglu, D.; Autor, D.H. and Lyle, D. (2004) ‘Women, War, and Wages: The Effect of 
Female Labor Supply on the Wage Structure at Midcentury’, Journal of Political 
Economy 112.3: 497–551 
 
Acosta, P. (2006) Labor Supply, School Attendance, and Remittances from International 
Migration: The Case of El Salvador, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3903, 
World Bank 
 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and Pozo, S. (2006) ‘Migration, Remittances, and Male and Female 
Employment Patterns’, American Economic Review 96.2: 222–26 
 
Annan, J.; Blattman, C.; Mazurana, D. and Carlson, K. (2009) Women and Girls at War: 
‘Wives’, Mothers and Fighters in the Lord’s Resistance Army, HiCN Working Paper 63, 
Households in Conflict Network (www.hicn.org) 
 
Beaman, L. (2008) ‘Social Networks and the Dynamics of Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence 
from Refugees Resettled in the U.S.’, Working Paper, Evanston IL: Northwestern 
University  
 
Blattman, C. and Miguel, E. (2010) ‘Civil War’, Journal of Economic Literature 48.1: 3–57 
 
Bozzoli, C. and Muller, C. (2010) ‘The Impact of Violence on Income Expectations’, 
unpublished manuscript, DIW Berlin 
 
Czaika, M. and Kis-Katos, K. (2009) ‘Civil Conflict and Displacement: Village-Level 
Determinants of Forced Migration in Aceh’, Journal of Peace Research 46.3 
 
Damon, A.L. (2010) ‘Agricultural Land Use and Asset Accumulation in Migrant Households: 
The Case of El Salvador’, Journal of Development Studies 46.1: 162–89 
 
—— (2007) Household Labor Allocation in Remittance-Receiving Households: The Case of 
El Salvador, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota 
 
Engel, S. and Ibáñez, A.M. (2007) ‘Displacement Due to Violence in Colombia: A Household-
Level Analysis’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 55: 335–65 
 
Fernandes, R. and De Felicio, F. (2005) ‘The Entry of Wife into the Labor Force in Response 
to the Husband's Unemployment: A Study of the Added Worker Effect in Brazilian 
Metropolitan Areas’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 53.4: 887–911 
 
Finegan, T.A. and Margo, R.A. (1994) ‘Work Relief and the Labor Force Participation of 
Married Women in 1940’, Journal of Economic History 54.1: 64–84 
 
Funkhouser, E. (1992) ‘Migration from Nicaragua: Some Recent Evidence’, World 
Development 20.8: 1209–18 
 
Goldring, L. (2002) Rethinking Remittances: Social and Political Dimensions of Individual and 
Collective Remittances, CERLAC Working Paper Series, University of York 
 
Hanson, G.H. (2007) ‘Emigration, Remittances, and Labor Force Participation in Mexico’, 
Integration and Trade Journal 27: 73–103 
 36 
 
House of Commons (2004) Migration and Development: How to Make Migration Work for 
Poverty Reduction, Sixth Report of Session 2003–4, International Development 
Committee, House of Commons, UK 
 
International Monetary Fund (2006) Republic of Tajikistan: Recent Economic Developments 
and Statistical Appendix, Washington DC: IMF 
  
—— (2005) IMF Country Report No. 05/131. Republic of Tajikistan: Selected Issues and 
Statistical Appendix, Washington DC: IMF 
 
—— (2001) IMF Country Report No. 01/69. Republic of Tajikistan: Statistical Appendix, 
Washington DC: IMF 
 
Jianakoplos, N.A. and Bernasek, A. (1998) ‘Are Women More Risk Averse?’, Economic 
Inquiry 36: 620–30 
 
Justino, P. (2012, forthcoming) ‘War and Poverty’, in M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, Oxford: OUP 
 
—— (2009) ‘Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective on the Causes and 
Duration of Warfare’, Journal of Peace Research 46.3 
 
Justino, P. and Shemyakina, O. (2008) Private and Public Transfers as a Coping Strategy 
Under Armed Conflict: The Case of Tajikistan, Working Paper 
 
Killingsworth, M.R. (1983) Labour Supply, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Kireyev, A. (2006) The Macroeconomics of Remittances: The Case of Tajikistan, IMF 
Working Paper, Policy Development and Review Department, Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund 
 
Lundberg, S. (1985) ‘The Added Worker Effect’, Journal of Labor Economics 3.11: 11–37 
 
Munshi, K. (2003) ‘Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor 
Market’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118.2: 549–97 
 
Olimova, S.and Bosc, I. (2003) Labour Migration from Tajikistan, Geneva: International 
Organization for Migration 
 
Rodriguez, C. and Sanchez, F. (2009) Armed Conflict Exposure, Human Capital Investments 
and Child Labour: Evidence from Colombia, HiCN Working Paper 68, Households in 
Conflict Network (www.hicn.org) 
 
Rodriguez, E.R. and Tiongson, E.R. (2001) ‘Temporary Migration Overseas and Household 
Labor Supply: Evidence from Urban Philippines’, International Migration Review 35.3: 
709–25 
 
Schubert, R.; Brown, M.; Gysler, M. and Brachinger, H.W. (1999) ‘Financial Decision-Making: 
Are Women Really More Risk-Averse?’, American Economic Review 89: 381–5  
 
Shemyakina, O.N. (2009) The Effect of Armed Conflict on the Marriage Market for Women: 
Results from Tajikistan, HICN Working Paper 66, Households in Conflict Network 
(www.hicn.org) 
  
 37 
 
—— (2007) ‘Armed Conflict, Education and the Marriage Market: Evidence from Tajikistan’, 
PhD dissertation, University of Southern California 
 
State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan (2006) Tajikistan: 15 Years of the 
State’s Independence, Dushanbe 
 
Sunden, A.E. and Surette, B.J. (1998) ‘Gender Differences in the Allocation of Assets in 
Retirement Savings Plans’, American Economic Review 88: 207–11  
 
Voors, M.; Nillesen, E.; Verwimp, P.; Lensink, R. and van Soest, D. (2010) Does Conflict 
Affect Preferences? Results from Field Experiments in Burundi, MICROCON Working 
Paper 21, Brighton: MICROCON, IDS (www.microconflict.eu) 
 
World Bank (2006)Tajikistan Policy Note: Enhancing the Development Impact of 
Remittances, Report 35771-TJ, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, 
Europe and Central Asia, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
